By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and drawdifferentinferencesfromit(e.g., Carpendale&Chandler,1996).However,much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children's expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties' belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children's inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.
RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS
• Understanding the conditions under which other agents will change their minds is a key component of social cognition.
• Considerable evidence suggests that children themselves learn rationally from data: integrating evidence with their prior beliefs.
• Do 4-to 6-year-olds expect other agents to learn rationally?
Can they use others' prior beliefs and data to predict when third parties will retain their beliefs and when they will change their minds?
• Hereweuseacomputationalmodelofrationallearningtomotivate predictions for an ideal observer account, as well as five alternative accounts. We found that children expect third parties to be rational learners with respect to their own prior beliefs.
• The data were not consistent with alternative accounts. In particular, children did not expect others simply to retain their own prior beliefs, learn from the data without integrating it with their prior beliefs, or share the children's beliefs. Rather, children expected agents to learn normatively from evidence.
| INTRODUCTION
Expectations of rational agency support our ability to predict other people'sactionsandinfertheirmentalstates (Dennett,1987; Fodor, 1987) . Adults assume that agents will take efficient routes towards theirgoals (D'Andrade,1987; Heider,1958) ,andstudieswithinfants suggest that these expectations emerge very early in development ThisisanopenaccessarticleunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivsLicense,whichpermitsuseanddistributioninany medium,providedtheoriginalworkisproperlycited,theuseisnon-commercialandnomodificationsoradaptationsaremade. ©2017TheAuthors.DevelopmentalSciencePublishedbyJohnWiley&SonsLtd. (Skerry, Carey, & Spelke, 2013) . By the end of the first year, infants can use situational constraints, along with knowledge about an agent's goal, to predict an agent's actions. Similarly, they use knowledge of an agent's actions and situational constraints to infer the agent's goal, as well as knowledge of an agent's actions and goal to infer unobserved situational constraints (Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Gergely & Csibra,2003; Gergely,Nádasdy,Csibra,&Bíró,1995) .Suchworkhas inspired computational models of theory of mind that formalize the principle of rational action and successfully predict human judgments (Baker,Saxe,&Tenenbaum,2009; Baker,Saxe,&Tenenbaum,2011; Jara-Ettinger, Baker, & Tenenbaum, 2012) . Here however, we ask whether learners' expectations extend to the more colloquial meaning of the word 'rational': the expectation that other people's judgments and beliefs have a basis in the evidence they observe.
Note that this is distinct from the question of whether children themselves draw rational inferences from data. Decades of research suggest that very young children can integrate prior beliefs with small samples of evidence to infer the extensions of word meanings, identify object categories, learn causal relationships, and reason about others' goal-directedactions (seeGopnik&Wellman,2012; Schulz,2012; and Tenenbaum,Kemp,Griffiths,&Goodman,2011,forreviews) .However, despite extensive work on children's theory of mind (see Wellman, 2014 , for discussion and review), less is known about how children expectotherstolearnfromevidence.Althoughclassictheoryofmind tasks look at whether children expect others to update their beliefs given diverse forms of epistemic access to data -including direct perceptualaccess(e.g., Wimmer&Perner,1983) ,indirectclues(e.g., Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991) and testimony (e.g., Zaitchik, 1991 ) -these involve a relatively simple instantiation of the expectation that others will learn based on their observations of the world: children need only understand whether the agent does, or does not, haveepistemicaccesstobelief-relevantinformation.Suchstudiesdo not ask whether children understand that agents might evaluate evidence differently or draw different inferences from identical evidence.
The studies that do look at children's understanding of how third parties might evaluate evidence suggest that an 'interpretative theory ofmind'isarelativelylatedevelopment (Astington,Pelletier,&Homer, 2002; Carey & Smith, 1993; Chandler & Carpendale, 1998; LaLonde & Chandler, 2002; Myers & Liben, 2012; Pillow & Mash, 1999; Ross, Recchia, & Carpendale, 2005; Ruffman, Perner, Olson, & Doherty, 1993) .Notuntil6and7yearsdochildrenunderstand,forexample,that an ambiguous line drawing can be viewed as two different kinds of animals (Carpendale&Chandler,1996) orthaticonicsymbolsaresubject to different interpretations (Myers & Liben, 2012) . Young children's failure to understand that agents can reach different conclusions from the same evidence suggests that children might have difficulty understanding how other agents' prior knowledge affects the interpretation of data.
Arguably,however,understandingthatevidenceisambiguousand
thus open to interpretation may be more challenging than understanding the conditions under which others might be expected to learn from evidence. Relatively little work has looked at what children understand about others' inferences from data, and the findings here are mixed.
Forinstance,both4-and6-year-oldsrecognizethatanunseenmarble must be blue if it is drawn from a bag containing only blue marbles; however,only6-year-oldsrecognizethatathirdparty(whoknowsthe contents of the bag) will make the same inference and thus know the colorofthemarble (Sodian&Wimmer,1987) .However,4-year-olds do understand that if covariation evidence suggests that one of two causes is correlated with an outcome and the experimenter tricks a puppet by reversing the evidence, the puppet will conclude that the wrongvariableisthecause (Ruffmanetal.,1993) . Such studies suggest that by 4, children are at least beginning to understand that third parties learn from evidence in ways that go beyond mereperceptualaccesstodata.However,theyleaveopenthequestion of whether children can use patterns of evidence to understand when others will change their minds, and the degree to which children integrate others' prior beliefs in predicting their learning. Do children expect others to update their beliefs from data in cases where learning requires representing not merely an agent's access to evidence but the agent's abilitytodrawappropriateinferencesfromtheevidence?
To ask whether children expect others to rationally update their beliefs from data we borrow from two influential tasks in the literature.Thefirstistheclassicfalsebelieftask (Wimmer&Perner,1983) .
The other is derived from work looking at infants' and children's understanding of the relationship between samples and populations (e.g., Denison & Xu, 2014; Gweon, Tenenbaum, & Schulz, 2010; Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008) .
Specifically, we show a child and another agent (a Frog puppet) two boxes: one containing more rubber ducks than ping-pong balls (the Duck box) and one containing more balls than ducks (the Ball box).
The Frog leaves, and the child watches as the boxes are either moved and returned to the same location (so the Frog has a true belief about the location of each box) or switched (so the Frog has a false belief aboutthelocationofeachbox).Attest,theFrogreturns,andboththe child and the Frog watch as the experimenter reaches into the Duck box and draws a sample of three or five ducks either apparently at random (without looking into the box) or selectively (looking in and fishingaround).AfterboththechildandtheFrogseethesampleof data, children are asked, 'Where does Froggy think the Duck box is now?'SeeFigure1foraschematicoftheprocedure.
Both the ability to reason about others' false beliefs (see Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010) and the ability to recognize when data are sampledrandomlyorselectively(e.g.,Xu&Denison,2009)emergerelativelyearlyindevelopment.However,childrendonotreliablyprovide accurate responses in explicit false belief tasks until later childhood (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 , for review) and as noted, the ability to understand that identical evidence can be open to different interpretationsemergesevenlater(e.g., Astingtonetal.,2002; Carey & Smith, 1993 , Chandler & Carpendale, 1998 LaLonde & Chandler, 2002; Myers & Liben, 2012; Pillow & Mash, 1999; Ross etal, 2005; Ruffmanetal.,1993) .Becauseweareinterestednotinchildren'sown inferences from the data, but in their inferences on behalf of a third party whose beliefs may differ both from the child's own and those supportedbytheobserveddata,herewefocuson4.5-to6-year-olds.
As shown in Table1, if children expect the Frog to update his beliefs from evidence, then the cross between old and new locations F I G U R E 1 Schematicoftheprocedure.InthePreferencephase(a)childrenareshownthetwoboxeswithdifferentproportionsofducks and balls and asked to identify the Duck box and Ball box based on each box's majority object. Then children are introduced to the Frog puppet and his preference for ducks and the Duck box and then learn, along with the Frog, that the boxes can either each move back and forth to stay inthesamelocationormovefromonesidetotheothertoswitchlocations.IntheBeliefPhase(b)childreneitherseetheboxesswitchlocations (NewLocationcondition)orstayinthesamelocation(OldLocationcondition)whiletheFrogisabsent.WhentheFrogreturns,hewilleither haveafalsebeliefaboutthelocationoftheDuckbox(NewLocationcondition)oratruebeliefaboutthelocationoftheDuckbox(OldLocation condition). Children are asked two check questions to confirm that they have tracked the locations of the boxes and the Frog's belief at the end oftheBeliefPhase.IntheSamplingPhase(c)theFrogreturnsandtheexperimentersampleseitherrandomly(RandomSamplingcondition)or selectively(SelectiveSamplingcondition)fromthehiddenDuckbox.AttheTestPhasechildrenareaskedwheretheFrogthinkstheDuckboxis and random and selective sampling predicts a pattern of responses distinct from the pattern that would be generated if children adopted many other possible response strategies. We will walk through the predictions of our account intuitively; however, to clarify our proposal, we also include a computational model providing quantitative predictions for both our account and a number of alternatives, in each experimentalcondition(seeFigure4andAppendixS1).Thedetailsof the model are not critical to our proposal as our goal here is not to evaluate the Rational Learning model per se. Given that there are only five conditions, and some of them (e.g., both selective sampling conditions) make overlapping predictions, correlations between the model and children's performance may be less convincing than the relative fit of the Rational Learning model in comparison to the alternative models. That is the analysis we include here. In addition, it is helpful to consider the qualitative intuitions behind these models insofar as they motivate our predictions and ground our intuitions in a precise statement of what constitutes 'rational inference' in this context.
| Predictions of the rational inference account
If children expect agents to rationally update their beliefs, they should respond jointly to the type of sampling process and the Frog's prior beliefs about the boxes' locations together with his knowledge that the boxes can move. A sample randomly drawn from a population is likely to be representative of the population. Thus we predict that in the Random Sampling conditions, children should expect the Frog to use the evidence to verify or update his beliefs about the location of the Duck box.
Specifically, randomly sampling three ducks in a row is improbable unless the evidence is sampled from the Duck box. Thus when evidence is randomly sampled from the Old Location (OL/RS), children should infer that the Frog will retain his belief and will continue to think that the Duck box is in the Old location. However, when evidence is randomly sampled from the New Location (NL/RS_3 ducks and NL/RS_5 ducks) children should believe that the Frog may now update his former false belief, inferring that the Duck box may have beenmovedtotheNewLocation.Moreover,thestrengthofchildren's inferences should depend, in a graded way, on the strength of evidence they observe: they should be more confident that the Frog will change his mind when they see five ducks randomly drawn from the NewLocation(NL/RS_5ducks)thanwhentheyseethreeducks(NL/ RS_3ducks)randomlydrawn.
By contrast, selectively sampled evidence is uninformative about the population from which it is drawn. The experimenter can selectively draw any sample at all (representative or non-representative) from the population. Indeed, if the experimenter is trying to guarantee that she gets three ducks in a row, she should sample selectively regardless of whether she is drawing from the population where ducks are relatively common (the Duck box) or the population where ducks are relatively rare (the Ball box). Since the selectively sampled evidence is consistent with sampling from either box, a rational learner who integrates his prior beliefs with the data should retain his prior beliefs.That is, because both the Old and New Location are consistent with the data and only the Old Location is consistent with the agent's prior beliefs, we predict that children will expect the Frog to say the Duck box is in the Old Location in both the Old (OL/SS) and NewLocation(NL/SS)SelectiveSamplingconditions.
| Alternative accounts
In contrast to the pattern of responses consistent with third party rational inference (Table 1, evidence he will strongly conclude that the Ducks are in that location, but if he sees selectively sampled evidence, he will recognize that the evidence is uninformative and choose at chance (row d, Table 1 ). Yet another possibility is that the children think the Frog will attend to the sampled evidence but not as a rational learner would; they might, for instance, think that Frog will conclude that random sampling indicates that the sample of ducks is pulled from the Duck box and that selective sampling of ducks means the sample is pulled from the Ball box (row e, Table 1 ). Finally, children might respond at chance, either because they genuinely believe that the Frog will guess or because different children choose different strategies and thus, as a group, generate responses indistinguishable from chance responding (row f, Table 1 ).
CorrespondingtothequalitativepredictionsshowninTable1,Figure4
shows quantitative predictions for the rational inference account and each of the alternative accounts for all of the conditions in our study.
The model predictions can be compared with children's behavioral data.
In the experiment to follow, we test these different accounts and predict that children's responses will be best explained as inferring that the Frog will rationally integrate his prior belief about the boxes'
locations with the type of sampling process he observes. Note that this specific pattern of responding requires children to track simultaneously the true location of the Duck box, the Frog's belief about the location of the Duck box, and the probability of generating the observed sample from the population. The complexity of the task is necessary to distinguish children's responding to a third party's updating of his beliefs from responses children might make on other grounds 
| METHOD

| Participants and materials
Two hundred six children (mean: 66months; range: 54-83months)
were recruited from an urban children's museum and participated in the study. The testing occurred in three waves in the following order:
NL/RS_3andNL/SS;OL/RSandOL/SS;NL/RS_5.Withineachwaveof testing children were randomly assigned to condition. ping-pong balls. For the other box, referred to as the 'Ball box', the frontsectionwasfilledwith45ping-pongballsand15rubberducks.
(3:1 ratios were chosen because they are easily discriminable by preschoolers and because three consecutive ducks are far more likely to be randomly sampled from the Duck box than the Ball box.) The back sections of both boxes also contained rubber ducks and ping-pong balls, and were hidden from view. Each box was placed on a colored mat.AFrogpuppetservedastheagent.
| Design and procedure
We crossed the two locations where the Duck box could be at the 
| Preference phase
In all conditions, the experimenter showed the child the Duck and 
| Belief phase
Inclusion questions
In both conditions, the experimenter then asked children two questions to check that they understood the true locations of the boxes (location check) and the Frog's beliefs about the boxes (belief check). 
| Sampling phase
The experimenter brought the Frog back saying, 'Look, Froggy is back!'
The experimenter asked the Frog to watch the two boxes and then respondedtoapretendphonecallsaying,'Hello?Oh,youwantmeto takethree(fiveintheNL/RS_5condition)ducksfromtheboxonthe red(blue)mat?'(Theexperimenteralwaysnamedtheactuallocation of the Duck box.) We included the phone call to dispel any impression that the experimenter was pedagogically sampling from the box in order to teach the Frog (or child) the actual location of the Duck box.
Note that pedagogical sampling is always selective, but intentional sampling can be either random or selective: one can intentionally pull objects out at random or intentionally choose particular objects (see e.g., Gweon et al., 2010, for discussion) . In the Random Sampling conditions, the experimenter looked over her shoulder (i.e., not into the box) and reached through the hole into the Duck box three times in rapid succession, drawing out a duck each time and counting out 'One, 
| Test phase
In the final phase of the experiment after the sample of three ducks was drawn, children were asked the critical test question: 'Where doesFroggythinktheDuckboxisnow?'
| RESULTS
| Inclusion questions
Children's responses were coded from videotape by the first authors.
Forty-seven percent of the data was coded by a second coder, blind to condition and hypotheses. Inter-coder reliability was high (Kappa=.95,98%agreement).
We coded children's responses to the location ('Where is the duck Critically, however, the rational learning account does not predict better, or even simply uniformly different performance in the New Location conditions than the Old Location conditions (predictions whose investigation could be confounded to the degree that one group of children met more stringent inclusion criteria than the other).
Rather, it predicts a precise pattern of responses depending jointly on the Frog's initial beliefs about the boxes' location, the sampling process, and the amount of evidence observed. That is, this account makes predictions within each condition (where there are no differences in exclusion rates) and also predicts both commonalities and differencesacrossconditions.Neitherthepredictionthat,withineach condition, children should be more likely to expect the Frog's beliefs to be informed by randomly than selectively sampled evidence, nor the prediction that children should draw stronger inferences for the Old thantheNewLocationconditiongivenrandomly(butnotselectively) generated evidence, can be accounted for by an overall difference between the two conditions.
| Test question
Because we had a priori hypotheses about the pattern of results, we By contrast, for the children who answered at least one of the check questions incorrectly (the non-trackers), the linear contrast was not significant (F(1, 55) = 1.78, p = .15, η 2 = .12). Instead, children appeared to either respond at chance or respond to the last location where they had seen the ducks (see Figure 3) . Crucially, these results suggest that the children who met the inclusion criteria were not simply defaulting to some baseline response pattern but were instead responding as predicted: inferring that the Frog would rationally update his beliefs from the data.
We restrict our analyses to children who pass the inclusion criteria because there is no clear way to interpret the responses of children who lost track of the boxes' location or failed to represent the Frog's initialbeliefs.However,thelinearcontrastremainssignificantifall206 Rather, children's tendency to expect the Frog's beliefs to be more influenced by randomly sampled than selectively sampled evidence in both conditions is consistent with the Rational Learning account since, indeed, randomly sampled evidence is more informative than selectively sampled evidence about the population from which it is drawn.
F I G U R E 4 Predictionsmadebythe
Alsoaspredicted,numericallymorechildrensaidtheFrogwould
update his belief when five ducks were randomly sampled than when three ducks were randomly sampled. The difference between the NL/RS_3 condition and NL/RS_5 conditionwas not significant (Fisher's exact, p = .40); however, the graded nature of children's inferences was consistent with the predictions of the rational inference model. As a further test of the hypothesis that children's judgments on behalf of the Frog reflect an expectation of rational learning, rather than any alternative model (Table 1) 
| DISCUSSION
The results of the current study suggest that young children not only expect agents to act rationally with respect to their goals , they expect other agents to learn rationally from data.
To make inferences on behalf of another agent, children needed to integrate the agent's prior beliefs with the evidence the agent observed and the way the evidence was sampled. Children were inclined to believe that the Frog would change his mind only when there was strong evidence against the Frog's prior belief (i.e., in the NewLocation/RandomSamplingconditions).Childrendidnotexpect Although even the youngest children in our sample were able to draw inferences about how a third party would update his beliefs from data, this study provides suggestive evidence that this ability might increase with age. Future research might look both at how children's ability to draw inferences about others' learning changes over development and investigate the origins of this sensitivity earlier in childhood.
Abasicunderstandingofhowevidenceaffectsothers'beliefs(e.g.,the understanding that seeing leads to knowing; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Pratt&Bryant1990; Senju,Southgate,Snape,Leonard,&Csibra,2011) emerges very early. This knowledge, together with the ability to make predictions about rational action, opens up the possibility that in simpler contexts, even younger children might be able to draw inferences about how third parties might update their beliefs from data. It is also possible that children's representations of the processes that underlie belief revision may support the emergence of broader abilities in interpretive theoryofmind (Astingtonetal.,2002; Carey&Smith,1993 ,Chandler &Carpendale,1998 LaLonde&Chandler,2002; Myers&Liben,2012; Pillow & Mash, 1999; Ross etal., 2005; Ruffman etal., 1993) ; future research might investigate the relationship between understanding that evidence conflicts with prior knowledge and understanding that evidence can be ambiguous depending on prior knowledge. Bonawitzetal.,2011; Corriveau,Fusaro,&Harris,2009; Gweon, Pelton,Konopka,&Schulz,2014; Jaswal,2010; Jaswal,Croft,Setia,& Cole,2010; Koenig,Clement,&Harris,2004; Koenig&Harris,2005; Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 2015) . Our study extends the literature by suggesting that children also make relatively nuanced decisions about how and when children will expect others to learn.
The current study, however, does not indicate how broadly this ability extends, nor does it suggest the conditions under which children might fail to expect others to rationally update their beliefs fromdata.Herewesuggestanaccountofhowchildrenmightmake normative judgments on behalf of third parties; future research might test the limitations of this account. Also, as discussed, the current study was motivated in part by predictions from an ideal observer model of rational inference. The results are broadly consistent with that account. However, providing a rigorous test of the quantitative predictions of the rational inference model and alternative accounts remains an important direction for future work.
Asadults,weexpectotheragentstoberationalactorsnotonlyin
terms of the paths they take towards their goals, but also in terms of howtheyreasonaboutevidence.Herewefindthatchildren'sdevelopingtheoryofmindsupportsthesamekindsofinferences.By4½years, children are able to integrate others' prior knowledge and observed evidence to support predictions about when others will retain their beliefs and when they will change their minds.
Award(#0744213)toLS.
NOTES 1
Informationonthechildren'sgenderwasavailableonlyfor81%ofthechil-dren;thereportedpercentagereflectsthissub-sample.
2
Notethatalthoughagesdidnotdiffersignificantlyacrossconditions,the meanageofchildrenintheNL/RS_5conditionwas69months,compared to65monthsforchildrenintheNL/RS_3condition.Wearegratefultoan anonymous reviewer for pointing out the possibility that this age difference may have contributed to children's stronger inferences in the NL/RS_5 condition.
APPENDIX
Computational Model
To help clarify our proposal and specify what counts as 'rational inference' in these contexts, we developed a computational model that provides quantitative predictions for each experimental condition.
The model specifies how a rational agent would behave when presentedwiththesametaskthatwegaveourparticipants.Although many studies have used Bayesian models to assess children's ability to update their own prior beliefs from data (see Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Schulz, 2012; , for reviews) to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to consider children's ability to predict when another agent will (or will not) change his mind by considering both that agent's access to the data and his prior beliefs.
Finally, note that in suggesting that children's rational inferences on behalf of a third party can be captured by a Bayesian inference model, we do not mean to suggest that children have conscious, meta-cognitive access to these computations; rather, we suggest that such sophisticated computations may underlie the many implicit, rapid, accurate judgments that support everyday social cogni-
for each of the candidate hypotheses of Table 1 in the Main Text.
The model is specified at two levels. First, we built a model of the Frog as a rational learner, given the information that he has available to him. Then, we modeled children's rational inferences about the We adopt a Bayesian framework for modeling both these levels of rational inference. Bayesian inference models a learning event as an interaction of two factors: the agent's prior beliefs about a hypothesis, before seeing new data: p(h), and the probability that the hypothesis is true given the newly observed data, the likelihood p(D | h). These combine to yield the agent's updated posterior belief p(h | D). Given new data bearing on a hypothesis, Bayes' rule specifies how a rational agent should update her beliefs as:
We now turn to the model of the Frog's inference, from the perspective of an ideal observer (which we can consider the child as approximating). On each experimental trial, the experimenter draws ducks from the Duck box, either randomly or selectively, and the boxes may or may not have been switched. At that point, both the child and the Frog know whether the sample is drawn randomly or selectively but only the child knows whether the boxes have been switched. However, the Frog has some prior belief pswitch about whether the boxes were switched in his absence (given the demonstration that they can be switched), which is equivalent to having a prior belief about which box the ducks are being drawn from. We can specify these as p(hduck) = pswitch for the Duck box and p(hball)=1−pswitch for the Ball box. The Frog must integrate this prior belief with his observation of three (or five) ducks being drawn from the box. Under random sampling, the probability of drawing n ducks and zero balls, with replacement, 1 from the duck box is Thus we have a posterior distribution over the two hypotheses, where the posterior probability that the sample is drawn from the Duck box increases as the number of randomly sampled ducks increases, and remains equal to the prior under selective sampling. This reflects our intuition that the evidence is stronger with each new randomly sampled duck and unchanged with each selectively sampled duck.
HavingspecifiedarationalmodeloftheFrog'sinference,wenow describe our model of the experimental participants. We propose that children can approximately simulate the above inference, and when asked to say where they think the Frog thinks the duck box is, they report the output of this computation, subject to two approximations.Asisstandardpracticewhenmodelingbehavioralresponses (Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2013; Gweon et al., 2010; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007) , we assume that children probability match;
that is, the frequency with which they select responses is proportional to the posterior probability of each hypothesis. In a population of participants, this rule gives a distribution of responses that mimics the distribution of posterior beliefs, and it is an efficient scheme for approximating probabilistic inference (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014) . We also consider the possibility that on each trial, there is a nonzero probability that children may have been inattentive or confused. We therefore include a noisy response parameter, perror, estimating the probability that a participant gives a box choice selected uniformly at random, instead of the response predicted by the model. Thus our model at this point has two parameters: the Frog's prior belief, p_switch, about whether the boxes were switched, and the noisy response parameter, p_error. To estimate pswitch, we used the ratio of children's responses on the initial belief question:
We have no analogous way to derive a plausible independent and numerically precise estimate of perror. For the results displayed in
Figure4, we set perror = .25; as children had to pass two inclusion checks,atmost25%ofincludedchildrencouldhavebeenansweringat
chance.
p(h|D) ∝ p(D|h)p(h)
( While we have described our model mathematically, it is possible to implement this model implicitly by simple sampling operations, without making any explicit statistical calculations. We describe one such implementation written in the probabilistic programming language Church (Goodman, Mansinghka, Roy, Bonawitz, & Tenenbaum, 2008; Goodman&Tenenbaum,2014) .
We implemented the Rational Learning model, and all of the alternative models presented in Table 1 in the probabilistic programming languageChurch (Goodmanetal.,2008; Goodman&Tenenbaum,2014) .
We used the webchurch implementation, available at https://github. com/probmods/webchurch or interactively at https://probmods.org/ play-space.html. To evaluate the following Church code, copy and paste the code text into the environment available in the latter link.
The following code block is sufficient to reproduce all of the model predictions described here; to obtain the predictions for individual conditionsgivenaspecifiedmodel,modifythevariablesnum-draws, actual-switch,andsampling-mannerasdescribedinthetext.Toobtain the predictions of different (alternative) models, the predictions of the different(alternative)models(a)-(f),modifythevalueofthevariable which-modeltotheappropriate'a-'finthecodelistedinDataS1.
APPENDIX NOTE
1 While the experiment used sampling without replacement, our model used sampling with replacement because the analysis is conceptually simpler and for large populations (i.e., the 60 objects in the box here) the difference between the distributions underlying sampling with and without replacement is negligible.
